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A principle that anyone who benefits from an activity to




A sub-principle within the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle that
requires anyone who derives an indirect benefit from an
activity to contribute to the costs of undertaking it
Bequest value In the context of the environment, the value that individuals
derive from preserving the environment for the benefit of
future generations
Biodiversity Broadly defined as the variety of all life forms and the
interactions between them
Cost  sharing Allocation of the funding of activities among individuals,
groups and governments on behalf of the general community
Duty of care An obligation not to harm another person or their property.
In the context of conservation, it is a legal obligation
requiring individuals to not use their land, or permit it to be
used, in a way that interferes with another person’s right to
use and enjoy their land
Existence value The intrinsic value placed on an environmental good. This
value is unrelated to any actual or potential use of the good
Ex situ conservation Conservation of species outside of their natural habitat — for
example, in zoos or botanical gardens
Externalities A  ‘spillover’ where the actions of an individual result in
costs or benefits to others that the individual creating them
does not bear
In situ conservation Conservation of species in their natural habitat
Internalising
externalities
Processes causing individuals to bear the costs or receive
the benefits of externalities created by their actions
On-ground
activities
Activities, such as revegetation, undertaken at the
property, catchment and/or regional level that aim to
conserve biodiversityVI GLOSSARY




A principle requiring polluters (impacters) to meet the full
costs, including external costs, of their actions
Property rights The bundle of ownership, use and entitlement rights and
responsibilities that a user has over a good or resource
such as land. These rights and responsibilities are given
expression through law (common law or legislation),
custom or tradition.
Public goods A good displaying two characteristics: (1) once the good is
provided to one individual, it is provided to all
simultaneously (‘non-excludable’); and (2) enjoyment of the




A sub-principle within the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle that
requires anyone who derives a direct private benefit from an
activity to contribute to the costs of undertaking itKEY POINTS VII
Key points
•   Many resource users undertake actions that conserve biodiversity. If, however,
there were public demand for more conservation than would be provided voluntarily
by the private sector alone, there are two broad principles for determining who
should bear the costs — ‘impacter pays’ or ‘beneficiary pays’. The two principles
have different efficiency and distributional effects.
•   A fundamental step in determining which cost sharing principle to apply is the
clarification of the rights and responsibilities implied by existing property rights. This
is an important issue that requires further work.
•   If property rights effectively require resource users to meet an environmental
standard, resource users who fail to achieve this may be considered to generate
external costs. In these circumstances, on efficiency grounds, the impacter pays
principle should generally be adopted to internalise external costs. This effectively
amounts to enforcement of an individual’s existing legal responsibilities. However, if
the costs of implementing the impacter pays principle were to outweigh its
efficiency advantages, the beneficiary pays principle may be considered.
•   In the short term, the community may expect a higher environmental standard than
is required under existing property rights. The beneficiary pays principle may be
relevant to encourage additional consideration in this case, provided the benefits
warrant the costs.
•   If the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle were adopted and a government chose to meet
some share of costs, its share need not equal the full public benefits of the
additional conservation. In principle, the public contribution should be the minimum
necessary to trigger additional conservation by the private sector. Calling for bids
(auctions) for the voluntary provision of conservation by the private sector may be
one way to determine this minimum.
•   Long term payments to resource users for undertaking conservation can be costly
for the community. Alternatively, property rights may change to reflect new social
expectations. This may occur through the evolution of the common law, or through
government legislation. This may in turn enable application of the ‘impacter pays’
principle if resource users subsequently failed to meet the new (higher) obligations.
However, redefinition of property rights is rarely undertaken lightly, and give rise to
questions of compensation or other assistance.OVERVIEW IX
Overview
Conservation of biodiversity on private land can entail significant costs. This paper
discusses the principles for sharing the costs of biodiversity conservation between
individuals, groups and the general community. It illustrates situations in which the
different cost sharing principles may be relevant and highlights some issues that
arise in determining who should pay for biodiversity conservation.
Many resource users — either individually or collectively — undertake actions that
conserve biodiversity. Although these actions may generate public benefits,
governments need not bear any of the costs of these activities — the community can
‘free ride’.
However, there may be community demand for conservation above what is already
provided by the private sector and government reserves. A fundamental step in
determining who should fund any additional conservation on private land — that is,
which cost sharing principle should apply — is understanding the rights and
responsibilities implied by property rights. These rights and responsibilities in
relation to biodiversity are not always clear. This is an important issue that requires
further attention.
If property rights effectively require resource users to maintain an environmental
standard, resource users who fail to achieve it may be considered to generate
external costs. In these circumstances, on efficiency grounds, the ‘impacter pays’
principle should generally be adopted to internalise the external costs. This
effectively amounts to enforcement of an individual’s existing legal responsibilities.
In contrast, application of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle in such cases would
effectively undermine the responsibilities imposed by property rights. However, if
the costs of implementing the ‘impacter pays’ principle were to outweigh its
efficiency advantages, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may be considered. The final
choice of principle, and how it would be implemented, would need to account for
equity considerations.
The beneficiary pays principle is also more relevant if the community demands
resource users to provide conservation beyond the level required by existing
property rights.X OVERVIEW
Under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, governments should only provide funds
where they generate net public benefits and where conservation would not already
occur. To ensure accountability and to avoid establishing perverse incentives, such
investment of public funds needs to meet other criteria, including that:
•   public payments are clearly linked to the delivery of outcomes;
•   funding does not cover costs related to private benefits (although there may be
some exceptions); and
•   funding achieves value for money by maximising the conservation benefits
received for each dollar of funding.
If the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle is used to assign cost shares, a government’s
share need not be equal to the full public benefits generated. Governments need
contribute only the minimum necessary to trigger appropriate conservation by the
private sector. While it may be difficult to determine this minimum payment in
advance, one way may be by calling for tenders or bids (auctions) for the voluntary
provision of conservation. This may help governments achieve value for money by
allocating its funds to issues and providers that deliver the greatest environmental
gain for a given cost.
Long term payments to resource users for undertaking conservation can be costly
for the community. Alternatively, property rights may change to reflect new social
expectations. Changes to property rights may occur through the evolution of the
common law, or through government legislation. This may enable application of the
‘impacter pays’ principle if resource users subsequently fail to meet the new
(higher) obligations.
The choice between long term payments under the beneficiary pays principle or
changing property rights should be influenced by which option generates the highest
net benefit. Any refinement of property rights is rarely undertaken lightly or without
compensation or other assistance such as government meeting a greater share of
costs in the short term to help resource users adjust. The merits of compensation or
adjustment assistance would need to be assessed on a case by case basis.INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
There is considerable demand among sections of the Australian community for the
conservation of biodiversity. This reflects changing preferences for the
environment, given factors such as an improved understanding of the significance
of species loss (Bennett, Backhouse and Clark  1995) and rising income levels.
Governments have responded to these demands with legislation and policies at both
the Commonwealth and State levels, and with national strategies such as the
National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity and the
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development. Australia is also a
party to international agreements dealing with biodiversity, such as the Convention
on Biological Diversity and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna.
In addition to highlighting a role for governments, the National Strategy for the
Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity recognises a need for biodiversity
conservation to be integrated with private land management. In Australia, this is
particularly important because the private sector controls or manages over 60 per
cent of land (AUSLIG 2000).
Several policy options are available to governments to prevent or slow the loss of
biodiversity or to enhance biodiversity. Some options, such as support for research
and development or the provision of information, may be comprehensive in nature
— that is, they target all natural resource users. Others may target specific
problems, regions or resource users. Examples of both types of policy options
available to governments include:
•   directly providing in situ conservation — for example, by establishing or
managing World Heritage areas, national parks and nature reserves;
•   providing  ex situ conservation — for example, by collecting and preserving
specimens of selected species in zoos and botanical gardens;
•   regulating activities that affect biodiversity — for example, by prohibiting land
clearing without approval;
•   undertaking or providing funding for research into the effects of resource use
decisions on biodiversity and ways to address biodiversity decline;2 COST SHARING FOR
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•   educating, informing or persuading resource users to undertake (or refrain from
undertaking) certain actions, given their likely effects on biodiversity;
•   removing legislative and policy impediments to private sector conservation —
for example, by clarifying property rights over natural resources; and/or
•   implementing cost sharing arrangements to support on-ground activities
(box 1.1) for in situ conservation on private land.
This report focuses on cost sharing for on-ground activities to conserve biodiversity
that are undertaken at the property, catchment and/or regional level. Often a narrow
definition of on-ground activities is taken, including only those activities that
involve significant investment in capital. This report recognises a broader
definition, which includes these activities as well as those that do not necessarily
require capital investment, but that may still contribute to conservation outcomes —
for example, changes in irrigation practices.
Box 1.1 On-ground activities
Examples of on-ground activities and their intended effects include:
•   intercepting rainfall to reduce the impacts of salinity by slowing the rise of water
tables;
•   building structures to promote soil conservation and increasing surface cover to
control erosion; and
•   protecting riparian zones and stabilising stream banks to improve water quality and
reduce erosion.
The nature of biodiversity means that on-ground activities directed at primarily one
conservation issue may also affect other issues simultaneously. Revegetation, for
example, can provide buffer strips around existing remnants, protecting them from
encroachment; provide additional habitat for animals; and contribute to preventing soil
erosion.
Several government programs provide funding to help resource users conduct
conservation, for example, programs of the Natural Heritage Trust, such as Landcare
and Bushcare, distribute large sums for conservation on private land. The recently
announced National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality also intends to combine
funding contributions from the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments and
the private sector. State Governments (and some local governments) also administer
resource management programs that involve cost sharing arrangements. An example
is the Land Protection Incentive Scheme in Victoria.
Sources: MDBC  (1996); Prime Minister of Australia  (2000); RIRDC, LWRRDC and FWPRDC Joint
Venture Agroforestry Program and Environment Australia (2000).INTRODUCTION 3
While this report focuses on cost sharing for on-ground activities, many policy
options directed at delivering biodiversity conservation goals reflect decisions about
how the costs of conservation will be shared between individuals and governments.
Further, cost sharing arrangements are relevant not only in the context of
biodiversity conservation but also in other areas of government policy where
governments and the private sector work together in the pursuit of specific goals.
The ongoing nature of biodiversity conservation, along with the costs it is likely to
impose, highlights the need to determine effective and efficient cost sharing
arrangements for undertaking conservation. The aim of this study is to contribute to
the debate surrounding cost sharing for conservation on private land, by assessing
cost sharing principles from an economic perspective and by highlighting some
practical issues affecting their implementation.
1.1 What is biodiversity conservation?
Biodiversity is broadly defined as the variety of all life forms and the interactions
between them. It consists of all plants, animals, micro-organisms, the gene pool and
the ecosystems they form (Saunders and West 2000). Biodiversity may be classified
on three levels — genetic, species and ecosystem diversity (SEAC 1996). Genetic
diversity occurs within a particular species, providing its characteristics and
influencing its resilience or adaptability to change. Species diversity refers to the
interactions between species to form ecosystems, while ecosystem diversity occurs
at the level of entire biological communities such as wetlands, rainforests and
grasslands, and also extends to include the entire biosphere (Farrier  1995).
Biodiversity involves many dynamic processes and is enhanced by evolutionary
change, but reduced by extinctions and habitat degradation and loss (DEST 1996).
Conservation of biodiversity is important for several reasons (Brown et al. 1993;
DEST 1996; SEAC 1996; Tisdell 1991).
•   Biodiversity underpins the processes that support life, such as the maintenance
and regulation of water resources, atmospheric quality and climate, soil
formation, and the recycling of nutrients. As a result, biodiversity sustains
human life and industries that depend on biodiversity, such as agriculture.
•   Biodiversity provides natural ecosystems with resilience — that is, the ability to
recover from natural disasters such as drought, fire, flood and climate change.
•   Biodiversity provides potential future access to resources for goods and services
such as medicines, foods, fibres and tourism services.4 COST SHARING FOR
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•   For many people, biodiversity has aesthetic or recreational benefits, contributes
to a sense of cultural identity and/or has non-use values such as existence, option
and bequest values.
•   For some people, biodiversity should also be conserved for ethical reasons,
reflecting a belief that no generation has the right to use the earth’s resources
solely for its own benefit.
It is difficult to establish the current status of biodiversity in Australia because many
species have not yet been identified or described, let alone surveyed (SEAC 1996).
From an economic perspective, it is also difficult to know whether more or less
biodiversity should be conserved because estimates of all the costs and benefits of
conserving biodiversity are not available. However, the State of the Environment
Advisory Council (SEAC 1996) considers the loss of biodiversity as perhaps the
most serious environmental problem in Australia. The potentially irreversible nature
of its destruction and the lack of knowledge or certainty about the significance of
what is being destroyed (Farrier  1995) also suggest that a prudent approach to
biodiversity conservation is sensible. Further, the existence of legislation and
policies directed at biodiversity conservation indicate that governments have
determined, on behalf of society, that biodiversity conservation is important and that
it should increase above current levels.
Conservation of biodiversity refers to a range of actions that can:
•   protect biodiversity — such as the establishment and management of public and
private parks, reserves and sanctuaries;
•   maintain and manage biodiversity — undertaking activities in ways that do not
lead to long term reductions in biodiversity (such as altering irrigation practices
to reduce water use and sustain water flows and aquatic habitat), refraining from
activities that reduce biodiversity (such as clearing of native vegetation that has
adverse impacts on ecosystems and native wildlife), and responding to
threatening processes (such as by undertaking pest and weed control);
•   sustainably use biodiversity — such as the sustainable use of native forests,
grasslands, crocodiles and kangaroos; and
•   restore and enhance biodiversity — such as re-planting native vegetation.
All of these actions may involve cost sharing arrangements, depending on property
rights and legal responsibilities for conservation (chapter 4).INTRODUCTION 5
1.2 Paying for biodiversity conservation — what is cost
sharing?
Biodiversity conservation on private land depends on the behaviour and decisions of
resource users. The incentives provided by market forces to conserve biodiversity
are discussed in chapter  2. Some government policies also aim to encourage
additional conservation by the private sector.
The costs of conservation include the direct financial costs of conducting on-ground
activities and the forgone rate of return from alternative uses of the land and
resources used for conservation. The majority of these costs are likely to be incurred
by individuals (such as landholders) at a local or property level where on-ground
activities are implemented. Yet many benefits of biodiversity conservation (for
example, environmental stability) are experienced at a national, as well as local,
level. Further, while the current generation may bear the costs of biodiversity
conservation, the long term nature of environmental improvements means that
future generations accrue the benefits, at least in part. (Similarly, the current
generation could reap any short term benefits of resource degradation and pass the
longer term costs on to future generations).
Because different parties bear the costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation,
some on-ground activities that are desirable from a national perspective may not
occur because they do not generate net benefits to those implementing them — that
is, they are not privately profitable. As a result, insufficient conservation may occur
from a social perspective (chapter 2). This raises the question of whether it may be
in the interests of society for the wider community to meet some costs related to on-
ground activities to ensure they proceed. This would involve the government
meeting some costs of conservation on behalf of the general community, or ‘cost
sharing’. Cost sharing is sometimes called ‘investment sharing’ to reflect the notion
that investments in activities or practices promoting the long term health of the
environment earn an implicit return (Leybourne and Crawford 2000).
This report discusses a range of factors that affect whether, and how, governments
should be involved in cost sharing arrangements for biodiversity conservation. It
provides an economic perspective where the efficiency of cost sharing arrangements
is a key concern. However, other factors, particularly the equity or distributional
implications of cost sharing arrangements, will also need to be taken into account
by decision makers as part of the policy making process.6 COST SHARING FOR
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Some criteria for assessing cost sharing arrangements
Governments may seek to achieve various objectives through cost sharing
arrangements, including social, environmental and economic objectives. In doing
so, governments have a responsibility to meet society’s goals at least cost to the
public and without unnecessarily interfering with or ‘crowding out’ private sector
conservation efforts. In addition to being feasible and transparent, cost sharing
arrangements should aim to reflect other criteria, including:
•   effectiveness;
•   efficiency;
•   cost effectiveness; and
•   equity.
Effectiveness is concerned with the achievement of objectives. It relates to overall
outcomes, the quality of outcomes and the extent to which required standards are
met. Cost sharing arrangements must contribute to the achievement of conservation
goals if they are to be effective. Various factors can influence effectiveness, such as
the extent of community acceptance of a cost sharing arrangement, and the
integration of cost sharing arrangements for on-ground activities with other
conservation policies.
Economic efficiency is concerned with society obtaining the highest net benefits
from the allocation and use of its resources. Cost sharing arrangements are likely to
promote this outcome when they provide ongoing incentives for improved
efficiency in resource use over time. If cost sharing arrangements produce incentive
structures that encourage the desired outcomes, then they are also likely to be more
cost effective in terms of administration, compliance, enforcement and information
costs.
Cost effectiveness is concerned with achieving objectives at least cost — that is,
achieving  ‘value for money’. Cost effectiveness may be improved by targeting
activities or practices that produce high environmental benefits for a given cost.
‘Equity’ is about fairness and means different things to different people. One type,
for example, requires individuals in like circumstances to be treated the same —
‘horizontal equity’ — while ‘vertical equity’ is concerned with the distribution of
benefits across individuals with different income levels. Cost sharing arrangements
that are perceived as equitable are more likely to receive support and therefore may
incur fewer enforcement costs. Transparent and predictable processes are likely to
enhance the perceived equity of cost sharing arrangements.INTRODUCTION 7
Decisions about cost sharing arrangements may involve trade-offs between some of
these criteria; for instance, equity considerations and administrative feasibility and
cost can affect the efficiency or effectiveness of cost sharing arrangements.
1.3 The structure of this report
Market incentives for individuals to conserve biodiversity are discussed in
chapter 2. The cost sharing principles are introduced in chapter 3, while chapter 4
highlights some issues that affect which principle should be adopted as the basis for




2 Market incentives to conserve
biodiversity
In Australia, markets are generally considered an efficient means to distribute
resources to their most valued uses, and the role of governments in allocating
resources is limited. This chapter outlines how the market fares with respect to
biodiversity conservation by considering market incentives for private sector
conservation. It also considers whether there may be a role for governments to
encourage more conservation on private land than would otherwise occur through
private decisions in the marketplace.
2.1 The market for biodiversity conservation
Many individuals recognise the personal benefits they can derive from improving
biodiversity. However, individuals can only be expected to voluntarily undertake
actions that conserve biodiversity if these actions result in net benefits to them.
Benefits may be financial and/or intangible. Some individuals, for example, may be
motivated solely by altruism or philanthropy.
In some cases, activities that conserve biodiversity may not be viable for individual
resource users to undertake on their own because the costs of doing so may exceed
the benefits. However, the activity may be viable if it is jointly funded and
undertaken (box  2.1). In this case, those involved may be able to negotiate an
arrangement that results in net benefits to all of them. These arrangements may
involve more than one individual or other parties such as companies, associations or
community groups. Governments need not be involved in cost sharing for
conservation activities that voluntarily result from private arrangements such as
these, even though the community as a whole may derive some benefit from these
activities. The private benefits of conservation in these cases are sufficient for the
activities to proceed with private funding alone. The general community can thus
effectively ‘free ride’ on the provision of any public benefits that may arise:
It is common to find public goods supplied by the private sector simply because they
are joint in supply with a private good. There is generally no need for the public sector
to supply [such goods] … Such are the private benefits enjoyed … that private
provision is voluntary, with the public good benefits being incidental to the decision
but being provided all the same. (Bennett 1995, p. 428)10 COST SHARING FOR
BIODIVERSITY
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Box 2.1 Sharing costs within the private sector
The figure below presents the benefits and costs of a biodiversity conservation activity
for each of two resource users, A and B.
There is no incentive for either A or B to undertake individually any level of the
conservation because the benefits derived would be less than the costs incurred. In
this example, both individuals face the same marginal costs (curve MC) of undertaking








Qa+b Level of conservation
On the other hand, if A and B were to cooperate in this case, their joint benefits would
be sufficient to warrant conducting the activity. The joint benefits to A and B of
undertaking the activity are represented by curve MBa+b which rests above both MBa
and MBb because it represents the sum of both individuals’ benefits. If A and B
cooperate, they have an incentive to conduct Qa+b of conservation activity, from which
they both benefit.
In this example, the amount of conservation undertaken is expressed as homogenous
units. This may be, for example, the number of trees re-planted or the hectares of
native vegetation re-established. In practice, the units of conservation undertaken will
not be homogenous and the curves indicated above will not be smooth. However, the
general principles for the nature of costs and benefits apply.
In other cases, there may be uncertainty about the benefits of conservation,
particularly when these occur in the distant future. Alternatively, it may be too




for the activities to proceed. In these cases, markets may fail to distribute resources
to their most valued uses, so government action may be needed to establish the
incentives that will enable conservation to occur.
Market failure
Generally in market economies, the existence of clearly defined and enforceable
property rights (see below) creates incentives for individuals to allocate resources to
their most valued uses, because to do otherwise would result in a personal loss to
the resource owner or user. This allocation may include selling resources to others
who value them more, or making other arrangements to maximise their value.
Property rights comprise the bundle of ownership, use and entitlement rights that a
user has over a good or resource such as land, and include any responsibilities that
the user may have to others. Entitlements may include the right to grow crops and
develop land. Responsibilities may include using the land in a specified way (such
as grazing on pastoral lease land) or refraining from activities or practices that
interfere with the activities or enjoyment of others. As such, property rights govern
access to resources and reflect the community’s expectations about what resource
uses are acceptable. Land values generally reflect the current and potential
permissible uses encompassed in property rights (Wiebe, Tegene and Kuhn 1996).
These rights and responsibilities are given expression through law (common law or
legislation), custom or tradition. The rights and responsibilities implied by property
rights may change over time as community expectations change (chapter 4). An
efficient property rights structure is needed if markets are to work well at directing
and coordinating the use of resources. Such a structure has four main
characteristics:
•   universality — all resources are privately owned and all entitlements (rights over
how they can be used) are completely specified;
•   exclusivity  — all benefits and costs that result from owning and using the
resource only accrue to the owner, either directly or indirectly by sale to others;
•   transferability — all property rights are transferable from one owner to another
in a voluntary exchange; and
•   enforceability  — property rights are secure from involuntary seizure or
encroachment (IC 1998).
When all these features of a property rights system exist, individuals will accrue all
the benefits and incur all the costs of an action. In such cases, economic theory
indicates that what is in the best interests of an individual (what is privately12 COST SHARING FOR
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optimal) also results in outcomes that are optimal for society as a whole. However,
where all these property rights features do not exist, decisions made by individuals
in markets may not result in socially optimal outcomes. Property rights over aspects
of biodiversity are often poorly defined and some biodiversity values are poorly
reflected in markets. This may limit the potential of markets to conserve
biodiversity (Hodge 1997), resulting in market failure. Potential sources of market
failure affecting the conservation of biodiversity are:
•   public goods;
•   externalities; and
•   shortcomings in information.
Public goods
A public good displays two characteristics: first, once it is provided to one
individual, it is provided to all simultaneously (it is ‘non-excludable’); second,
enjoyment of the good by one individual does not reduce the benefits available to
others (it is ‘non-rival’ in consumption). Conservation activities often generate a
mix of private and public goods; for instance, the existence value of a species may
be considered a pure public good (Tisdell 1991), while benefits such as improved
stock shelter from retaining vegetation cover are private.
There is no incentive to pay for the provision of a public good because once it is
provided an individual cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of it. Thus,
there is an incentive to ‘free ride’ on the provision of public goods by others. As a
result, there is a lack of effective demand for public goods, implying that suppliers
would be unlikely to cover their production costs. Market forces thus fail to supply
— or undersupply — public goods, even though their supply would enhance
community welfare (Panayotou 1993). This often leads to underinvestment in public
goods relative to what would be socially optimal.
Externalities
A common consequence of inadequate specification of property rights is the
emergence of externalities. Externalities reflect a ‘spillover’ effect and occur where
the actions of an individual result in costs or benefits that affect others but that the
individual creating them does not have to bear. Externalities can result in
underinvestment in biodiversity conservation (or excessive loss of biodiversity)




When there are spillover benefits from the conservation of biodiversity, the market
value of land in commercial use can be less than its social value for conservation
purposes. Nevertheless, the land may be used for commercial purposes because the
market value reflects only the benefits that can be appropriated by its owners, who
may not be compensated for providing services associated with conservation. An
example is the spillover benefits generated by land uses that retain high levels of
tree cover, thereby regulating water flow in a watershed and reducing the risk of
flooding. Conversely, spillover costs occur when the tree cover is removed. A
problem occurs when the land is developed for commercial use by individuals
acting in their own self interest, when it is in the community’s interest to leave the
area in an undeveloped or less developed state (Tisdell 1991).
Information shortcomings
The efficient functioning of markets relies on individuals taking into account all
relevant information when making their production or consumption decisions.
However, many environmental processes are complex and poorly understood. It
may not always be possible to improve this understanding because the relevant
information does not exist or because the benefits of collecting it may not warrant
the costs. Where information is limited or poor, markets may not function
efficiently and individuals may make poor decisions. Information problems are
complicated by time lags and uncertainty: the full effects of decisions on
biodiversity and the environment are often not known; relationships between cause
and effect are not always clear, and environmental impacts often do not appear for
many years. Information problems could result in too little (or too much)
biodiversity conservation relative to what would be socially optimal.
2.2 A potential role for governments?
Given that markets for environmental goods and services may not function well,
there may be a role for governments to:
•   improve the definition of property rights over time;
•   ensure individuals’ decisions account for the effects on others (externalities);
•   supply, or provide a means to ensure the supply of, public goods; and/or
•   encourage the production and dissemination of relevant information (IC 1998).
However, the existence of market failure is not a sufficient condition for
governments to act because such action is not costless. Freebairn and
Zillman (forthcoming), for example, argue that the total cost of raising $1.00 of tax14 COST SHARING FOR
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revenue for government funding of programs is likely to exceed $1.30 as a result of
various factors such as collection and compliance costs. Thus government action
should occur only when the expected benefits of action exceed the costs. Ideally,
government actions should also be consistent so the effects of one action do not
unduly compromise the goals of another. For example, until 1983 a tax concession
was provided for clearing vegetation on land to be used for farming (Dumsday and
Chisholm 1991). While pursued for other reasons, such policies may reduce the
effectiveness, and increase the costs, of government actions to conserve
biodiversity.
2.3 Summary
•   Individuals have a market incentive to conduct conservation activities that result
in a net benefit to them.
•   Governments need not necessarily be involved in cost sharing arrangements for
activities that are the result of voluntary private decisions, even though these
activities may generate public benefits.
•   Market failure may limit the potential for markets to conserve biodiversity at a
socially optimal level, so there may be a role for governments to encourage the
private sector to undertake additional conservation.
•   Government action is not costless and should occur only when the expected
benefits exceed the costs.COST SHARING
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3 Cost sharing principles
This chapter introduces two principles that can form the basis of cost sharing
arrangements to achieve conservation outcomes. The ‘polluter (impacter) pays’
principle generally implies that governments do not share any of the costs of
conservation undertaken on private land unless the government is itself an impacter.
In contrast, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may imply some sharing of costs by
governments on behalf of the community. Some efficiency and equity aspects of
these principles are outlined in this chapter, while chapter 4 discusses some factors
that affect which principle should be adopted in practice as the basis for cost sharing
for biodiversity conservation.
3.1 ‘Polluter (impacter) pays’ principle
When individuals do not bear the full cost of their decisions, resources are
misallocated and market failure occurs (chapter 2). This failure may be avoided if
individuals are required to incur the full costs of their actions, including any
negative externalities their actions may impose on the community through
environmental damage and biodiversity loss.
In  1972, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
adopted the ‘polluter pays’ principle, which requires individuals to meet the full
costs of their actions, requiring them to bear the costs of implementing pollution
prevention and control measures necessary to maintain the environment in an
‘acceptable state’ (OECD  1975). The ‘polluter pays’ principle has since been
extended to cover a wider range of environmental damage including biodiversity
loss and is thus more accurately termed the ‘impacter pays’ principle
(SLWRMC 1999).
Under this principle, impacters are required to contribute to the costs of activities
that ameliorate or prevent biodiversity damage in proportion to their impacts on
biodiversity. As impacters may pass on some of these costs as higher prices,
consumers who benefit from activities that adversely impact biodiversity may also
meet a portion of the higher costs.
As a general rule under this principle, governments should not subsidise individuals
to conserve biodiversity, so the government’s cost share is generally zero, unless the16 COST SHARING FOR
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government is also an impacter and therefore required to pay. This compares with
the government’s cost share under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle (see below)
which could be as high as 100  per cent, depending on the public benefits of
conservation and other factors (chapter 4).
As impacters are forced to meet the full costs of their actions, the ‘impacter pays’
principle is embodied in obligations or compulsory measures to achieve
conservation. In contrast, enticements for resource users to voluntarily undertake
conservation reflect the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle (see below).
The ‘impacter pays’ principle may be implemented through various means (Pearce,
Markandya and Barbier 1989):
•   command and control mechanisms such as regulations that require resource
users, in the first instance, to bear all the costs of undertaking conservation
measures or refraining from actions that have an adverse impact on biodiversity;
•   charges levied on environmentally harmful outputs, inputs or practices; and
•   tradeable rights or permits to achieve environmental standards.
Efficiency aspects
In theory, adopting the ‘impacter pays’ principle forces producers and consumers to
bear the full cost of their actions by internalising externalities. Depending on the
characteristics of supply and demand, this in turn may raise the price of goods and
services that damage the environment. This could improve resource use efficiency
by removing production and consumption biases towards goods and services that
previously ‘overused’ underpriced environmental resources.
Over time, full cost pricing also provides incentives for the identification and
dissemination of ‘environmentally friendly’ technologies (Tilton  1995). This is
likely to reduce the scale of environmental problems to be addressed in future. If
applied through a market mechanism, such as tradeable permits, adoption of this
principle can also allow conservation goals to be achieved at least cost to the
community, because such mechanisms account for the variability in the costs of
control measures across resource users. Government outlays for achieving
conservation are also minimised when the ‘impacter pays’ principle is adopted as
the basis for cost sharing because producers and consumers meet the environmental
costs of their decisions. Budget savings by governments may then be directed to
meet other goals (box 3.1).COST SHARING
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Box 3.1 Achieving goals: paying the minimum
Government funds are not limitless, yet demands on governments to meet the needs of
the community are many. Where governments seek to meet as many objectives as
possible using limited resources, it is in the community’s interests for governments to
pay the minimum amount necessary to achieve conservation (or other) goals. This
implies a lower level of tax to fund the provision of government goods and services
and/or allows savings to be spent on the achievement of other objectives.
The notion of a government paying the minimum amount necessary to achieve
conservation outcomes is supported by a number of agencies. For example, the
Sustainable Land and Water Resource Management Committee (1999, p. 5) suggests:
Governments should, in general, contribute to works only up to a level sufficient to trigger
the necessary investment towards self-correcting, self-perpetuating natural resource
management systems that operate effectively.
Consistent with this approach is the notion that the public should ‘free ride’ on any
public benefits that may be provided by private initiatives:
When we decide interfering with the market is justified on public benefit grounds, we only
need to do just enough to change the behaviour of market participants in the manner desired
… Throughout the economy public benefits frequently free ride private investment. Good
policy takes advantage of this … (Hussey 1996, p. 11)
Public ‘free riding’ on the delivery of public benefits provided through private initiatives
is considered good policy because it embodies an efficient use of government funds:
… governments in the long run will be unable to address more than a small proportion of
the costs of environmental problems associated with agricultural activity (Batie 1986). Thus
there is a pressing need to maximise the conservation dividend from the limited government
funds that are available. (Marshall 1998, p. 1)
The minimum expenditure required from governments for conservation largely reflects
whether the ‘impacter pays’ or the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle is adopted. If the
‘impacter pays’ principle is adopted, the private sector meets the costs of biodiversity
conservation and government’s cost share is generally zero (unless the government is
also an impacter). Under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, the minimum amount of
government funding necessary may be greater than zero but need not necessarily
cover the full value of public benefits (chapter  4). Even low levels of government
funding may be sufficient to encourage additional conservation by the private sector.
However, governments should only provide funding where the benefits of doing so
exceed the costs.
However, for actions that aim to internalise external costs, the efficiency gains of
adopting this principle may be reduced if requiring impacters to meet the costs of
avoiding harm reduces incentives for the ‘victims’ to avoid it:
… sometimes the most efficient way to limit the damage done by diseconomies is not
to limit or change the activity of the offending parties, but rather to have the victims of
the diseconomy deal with it. The cost of moving away from or otherwise adjusting to18 COST SHARING FOR
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the diseconomies may be less than the costs of preventing or limiting the diseconomy at
its source. (Olson and Zeckhauser 1970, p. 516)
However, this depends on the extent to which the ‘victims’ have opportunities to
avoid harm, including the ability to negotiate a solution. These opportunities may be
limited in the case of many impacts on biodiversity, because the impacts are diffuse,
long term or uncertain.
Further, the ‘impacter pays’ principle is reflected in compulsory requirements for
resource users to undertake conservation. Therefore, its adoption may achieve only
limited compliance, and thus limited conservation outcomes, if resource users are
forced to adopt practices they might not otherwise choose. In fact, individuals may
have an incentive to try to avoid meeting costs under the ‘impacter pays’ principle.
For example, they might remove some special biodiversity features from their land
to avoid responsibility for them (Environmental Defense  2000, NSW
Farmers 2001). Environmental Defense (2000) refers to this as the ‘scorched earth’
technique for avoiding responsibility. It may be possible to limit such behaviour by
effective monitoring and enforcement but the costs of doing so may erode some of
the efficiency benefits of adopting this principle.
Equity aspects
The ‘impacter pays’ principle has been considered an equitable approach for sharing
the costs of biodiversity conservation because producers and consumers who benefit
from biodiversity loss are required to bear the social costs of their actions. This
occurs through increased costs to producers which may be passed on as increased
prices to consumers. In the case of salinity, for example, Kennelly  (1989, p.  3)
remarks:
This principle is economically efficient because it forces the polluter to accept society’s
valuation of salinity ... Not only does this principle encourage landholders to stop
polluting, but it allows for an equitable distribution of costs among those who are
directly profiting from the practices which cause salinity.
From another perspective, adoption of this principle may also be considered
equitable because those who ‘suffer’ the burden of biodiversity loss (‘victims’) are
not required to bear the costs of conservation.
3.2 ‘Beneficiary pays’ principle
The  ‘beneficiary pays’ principle (also known as the ‘victim pays’ principle —
Siebert 1992) requires anyone who benefits from an activity to contribute to theCOST SHARING
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costs of undertaking it (MDBC 1996). In contrast to the ‘impacter pays’ principle
which obliges (forces) resource users to pay for conservation, the ‘beneficiary pays’
principle can only be used to encourage voluntary conservation. This is because
compulsory conservation is equivalent to an obligation under existing property
rights. (Accordingly, introducing a new obligation for conservation would be
equivalent to changing property rights.)
An important feature of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle is the recognition that
conservation activities may generate private benefits to specific individuals or
groups of individuals, as well as public benefits to the community in general.
Therefore, it may be appropriate under this principle for individuals or groups to
contribute to the costs of undertaking activities that benefit them. It may also be
appropriate for governments to contribute to the costs of conservation, on behalf of
the general community, if the conservation generates public benefits.
Adoption of this principle is relevant to encourage voluntary conservation when
resource users do not have an obligation under existing property rights, or when
there is no financial incentive to undertake it (chapter 4).
Reflecting the potential private and public benefits of conservation, the
MDBC (1996) has identified two components of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle —
‘user pays’ and ‘beneficiary compensates’ — which should be applied together. The
cost sharing guidelines of some other agencies, such as the Victorian State
Groundwater Council (1997), also adopt this breakdown.
‘User pays’ principle
The ‘user pays’ principle requires anyone who derives a direct private benefit from
a conservation activity (for example, landholders benefiting from increased on-farm
production) to contribute to the costs of undertaking that activity (MDBC 1996). In
practice, adoption of this principle often involves individual beneficiaries making
payments to a collective provider, typically the government (Marshall 1998). An
example is national parks that charge entry fees to users to recover or share some of
the costs of conservation.
‘Beneficiary compensates’ principle
The ‘beneficiary compensates’ principle requires anyone (including government, on
behalf of the general community) who derives an indirect benefit from an activity to
contribute to the cost of undertaking it (MDBC 1996). This principle has also been20 COST SHARING FOR
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labelled the ‘provider gets’ or ‘community pays’ principle (Hanley et al.  1998;
Kennelly 1989; Stoneham et al. 2000).
The general community could include the local, regional or state community and
not necessarily society as a whole, particularly if benefits are largely localised.
Under this component, governments may meet a share of the costs of conservation
in recognition of the public benefits generated by conservation on private land.
Thus, in contrast to the ‘impacter pays’ principle, a government’s cost share under
the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may be greater than zero as a result of the existence
of public benefits.
Governments may implement the ‘beneficiary compensates’ component of the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle through a variety of means, including:
•   non-financial  ‘payments’ such as education and advisory services, and the
provision of other goods and services in-kind;
•   payment schemes whereby governments provide financial grants or concessional
loans to the private sector to undertake particular conservation activities (these
may involve uniform payments for each activity);
•   annual financial payments to resource users to cease or reduce environmentally
damaging activities or practices (often used with management agreements — see
chapter 4);
•   indirect financial incentives, such as tax deductions and rate relief; and
•   payments for the acquisition of rights or land (Tobey and Smets 1996).
Efficiency aspects
Adoption of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may encourage efficient resource use
by requiring the beneficiaries of conservation to pay the costs of it. Without a
pricing system for conservation, demands for it may be excessive and more
conservation may occur than is optimal for society. Charging consumers of
conservation for its benefits can thus encourage a more efficient level of
conservation (Kennelly 1989; Tilton 1995).
By requiring direct beneficiaries to share some of the costs of conservation, the
‘user pays’ component of this principle also reduces the call on government funding
for conservation under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle (box 3.1).
However, by requiring beneficiaries to pay for conservation, this principle can
imply payment of subsidies from government, which Baumol and Oates  (1975)
suggest could reduce incentives for firms to develop or adopt ‘environmentallyCOST SHARING
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friendly’ technologies. This is because their adoption by firms would result in a
reduction in subsidy payments to them in the future. By comparison, the ‘impacter
pays’ principle generates an incentive for firms to adopt these technologies, since
their adoption would reduce future liabilities for costs.
The potential efficiency benefits of adopting the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may
not arise if the user pays component is not applied because payment for costs in
such cases may default to the broader community. The ‘beneficiary pays’ principle
may thereby become synonymous with government funding under the ‘beneficiary
compensates’ principle which would result in the community meeting costs that
should be attributed to specific beneficiary groups. It is generally not efficient (or
equitable) for governments on behalf of the general community to meet the cost of
activities that generate private benefits (although some potential exceptions are
discussed in chapter 4). Further, resources can be misallocated if adoption of the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle results in over-compensation of individuals to provide
conservation.
Payment by government (subsidies) under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle can have
other potential disadvantages (Bromley  1996; Dumsday and Chisholm  1991;
IC 1998; Marshall 1998; Stevens 1994; Tobey and Smets 1996).
•   Subsidies could create incentives to damage the environment in order to qualify
for payments to restore it (Marshall  1998) or create incentives to threaten to
damage the environment (‘greenmail’).
•   Once established, subsidies may be difficult to phase out and often increase over
time and in breadth.
•   Payments to resource users for undertaking conservation may reinforce
perceptions of a right to degrade or to continue socially undesirable practices,
and of a right to an entitlement when biodiversity is conserved or restored in
future.
•   Long term payments to resource users for undertaking conservation can be
costly for governments with competing responsibilities; for example, the total
estimated cost of the South Australian land clearing compensation scheme
(established under the Native Vegetation Management Act  1985 and removed
in 1991) was around $70 million.
Equity aspects
The  ‘beneficiary pays’ principle has been considered an equitable approach for
sharing the costs of biodiversity conservation to the extent that it requires those who
benefit from an activity to pay the costs (MDBC  1996). If beneficiaries of22 COST SHARING FOR
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conservation are not charged, it can reinforce perceptions among those involved in
cost sharing arrangements that they are unfairly burdened with the costs of
conserving natural resources (AACM 1995).
Adoption of this principle may also be considered equitable because the community
contributes to meeting the costs of activities that otherwise may not be in the
interests of the individuals required to undertake them.
However, this principle has been criticised as being inequitable where it requires
those who ‘suffer’ the consequences of biodiversity loss to pay to stop the activities
that cause suffering or harm (the ‘victim pays’ principle — Siebert 1992). This is
because the ‘benefits’ of conservation often occur as costs of harm avoided. The
principle has also been criticised as an inequitable basis for cost sharing if
incorrectly applied, which has implications for efficiency as well (see above).
Kennelly  (1989, p.  5) observes that the ‘beneficiary compensates’ principle may
provide an excuse for policy makers not to apply the ‘user pays’ component:
Direct beneficiaries cannot always be identified so ‘the community’ is listed as the
beneficiary. Thus BPP [‘beneficiary pays’ principle] incorrectly becomes CPP
[‘community pays’ principle or ‘beneficiary compensates’ principle].
Thus, if specific beneficiaries are ‘lumped’ into the category of the general
community and their private benefits are described as ‘public benefits’, the general
community may be burdened with costs that individuals should meet under the ‘user
pays’ component. This potential misapplication may occur because the ‘beneficiary
compensates’ component is easier to adopt. It avoids the problems of having to
identify specific beneficiaries, and requires identification of only:
•   the suppliers of conservation services;
•   a mechanism to transfer funds to them; and
•   an appropriate level of conservation that they are to supply (Hanley et al. 1998).
3.3 Summary
•   There are two broad cost sharing principles — ‘impacter pays’ and ‘beneficiary
pays’.
•   The ‘impacter pays’ principle requires producers and consumers to meet the
external costs of their decisions. Thus it generally implies that government’s cost
share for conservation is zero (unless the government is an impacter). This
principle is reflected in policy approaches that compel resource users to conduct
certain conservation activities or to refrain from activities or practices that have
adverse impacts on biodiversity.COST SHARING
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•   The ‘beneficiary pays’ principle requires those who benefit from an activity to
contribute to the costs of undertaking it. It recognises that biodiversity
conservation may generate private benefits to specific individuals as well as
public benefits. Thus, this principle has two components —  ‘user pays’ and
‘beneficiary compensates’.
•   The ‘user pays’ component requires anyone who derives a direct private benefit
from an activity (for example, increased on-farm production) to contribute to the
costs of undertaking it.
•   The  ‘beneficiary compensates’ component applies when activities generate
indirect benefits experienced by the general community.
•   When governments are involved in cost sharing arrangements under the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle, they need only pay the minimum necessary to
trigger additional conservation by the private sector. Consistent with this
approach, the community should ‘free ride’ on public benefits that may occur as
by-products of private initiatives.SOME PRACTICAL
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4 Some practical considerations
The previous chapter introduced the cost sharing principles. This chapter highlights
some issues that may affect the decision about which principle to adopt as the basis
for cost sharing.
4.1 Clarifying property rights and responsibilities
Clarifying property rights is an important step in determining whether the ‘impacter
pays’ or the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle should be adopted as the basis for cost
sharing. This is because property rights determine not only the entitlements or rights
of resource users over resources, but also their responsibilities. These rights and
responsibilities are given expression through law (common law or legislation),
custom or tradition (chapter 2).
By determining individuals’ responsibilities, well-defined property rights implicitly
reflect the extent to which the community has a right to be free of the unwanted
consequences of individuals’ resource use decisions (Bromley and Hodge 1990),
such as biodiversity loss. Thus, depending on how they are defined, property rights
could imply an environmental standard that natural resource users are required to
meet.
If property rights are well-defined — such that individuals have a responsibility to
ensure a certain environmental standard — failure to meet that standard breaches
this responsibility and may be considered to impose external costs on the
community. In principle, the ‘impacter pays’ principle should be adopted to
internalise external costs and promote efficient outcomes. This is equivalent to
compelling individuals to meet their obligations under existing property rights
(chapter  3). By comparison, application of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle to
activities generating external costs would effectively undermine the responsibilities
imposed by existing property rights because individuals would not be forced to
meet their obligations. Instead, application of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle
restricts the property rights of beneficiaries. For example, for a community to pay
smokers not to smoke in restaurants is essentially deeming that smokers have the
right to smoke in restaurants and the community does not have the right to a smoke
free restaurant environment.26 COST SHARING FOR
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Nevertheless, in practice, adoption of the ‘impacter pays’ principle may provide an
incentive to avoid paying for conservation, so implementation requires effective
monitoring and enforcement. If these costs offset the positive incentive effects of
adopting the ‘impacter pays’ principle, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may be
preferred. However, the adoption of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle would provide
less incentive to constrain inefficient resource use over time (chapter 3).
In practice, property rights are not always clear and research and public discussion
is required to clarify them. For instance, a duty of care might be used to define
resource users’ environmental responsibilities but, as Bates (2001) observes, it is
not clear whether, and to what extent, duties of care for conservation apply in
Australia. The NSW Farmers’ Association (2001, p. 1) observes that exploring the
status and meaning of a duty of care is an important element of clarifying property
rights:
The key to clarifying property rights for land and ensuring that the entire community
equitably pays for public good environmental restrictions is to define an appropriate
‘duty of care’ for landholders.
Clarification of property rights is likely to be an on-going issue. This is because
community expectations of what is considered an acceptable environmental
standard may change over time to reflect a standard either higher or lower than that
implied under existing property rights. For instance, community preferences for
biodiversity conservation may increase in the light of improved understanding of
the significance of biodiversity loss.
Property rights may change to reflect changing community expectations. This idea
is not new as Bromley and Hodge (1990, p. 212) observe:
Institutional arrangements are social creations, fashioned to serve collective objectives.
The status quo property rights arrangements which serve agriculture so well exist for
historical reasons and may not necessarily be appropriate for the future … To assume
that these entitlements are necessarily pertinent and socially advantageous to the future
is unwarranted. Shifting values and changing perceptions of the role of agriculture will
surely bring about at least marginal shifts in property rights and policy entitlements.
Changes to property rights may evolve gradually over time or may be instigated by
government. Common law generally evolves slowly, depending on the cases
brought and judicial decisions made. Government can also change property rights
through legislation. Government changes can be refinements to existing rights and
responsibilities, or may be significant.
Frequent or significant changes to property rights can create uncertainty which adds
to the costs of doing business. This means that government changes to property
rights are only likely to be worthwhile if they reflect persistent (long term) changesSOME PRACTICAL
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to community preferences. Thus these changes are unlikely to be in the interests of
the community where changes in preferences are of a short term nature. Short term
changes would likely need to be funded within the confines of existing property
rights. If such changes reflected demands for a higher environmental standard,
adoption of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle is relevant to encourage additional
voluntary conservation.
If community preferences for a higher environmental standard are sustained in the
long term, governments may choose to change the property rights of resource
owners or managers or to adopt the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle. Adoption of the
‘impacter pays’ principle in this case effectively implies a change in property rights.
The choice would be influenced by the net benefits of each option. For example,
some observers have argued that total annual payments made to landholders under
the United States Conservation Reserve Program could have been better spent on
outright land purchase by the government (Wiebe, Tegene and Kuhn 1996) — that
is, the acquisition of property rights by the government. If property rights are
changed to require a higher environmental standard, this could imply application of
the ‘impacter pays’ principle if resource users subsequently failed to meet the new
(higher) obligations.
Some groups may consider it unfair for the government to change property because
this it can shift the cost burden of conservation. For example, resource users might
be expected to conserve biodiversity to a greater extent than they were expected to
previously. Thus, the West Bogan Landcare Group (2000, p. 1) remarks:
… for the vast majority of the twentieth century, landholders have been
encouraged/required to carry out property development at their own expense with some
tax incentives to induce such activities, to then be told that all that went before was
wrong and landholders must now wear the cost of the reverse activity or inactivity as
the case may be, is quite absurd.
Franks (2000) considers that changes (restrictions) to property rights should not be
imposed unless those who benefit from them are made to compensate those who
suffer. In contrast, the New Zealand Ministerial Advisory Committee (2000, p. 40)
suggests that compensation may be inappropriate:
We all forgo rights, freedoms and bear opportunity costs for the public good. Urban
dwellers are typically entwined in a web of land use regulation imposed for public good
reasons. The important [factors are] the extent and the implications of any restriction. In
particular, can the landholder still make reasonable use of their property as a whole?
This issue is not settled and requires further examination. Decisions by governments
to change the definition of property rights are rarely taken lightly because of their
social and economic implications. If a government were to decide to change28 COST SHARING FOR
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property rights to reflect changing social expectations, there may be arguments for
temporarily offering resource users assistance to help them adjust.
4.2 Applying the ‘impacter pays’ principle
By internalising external costs, the ‘impacter pays’ principle may be applied to
create incentives to reduce actions that have an adverse impact on biodiversity.
Identifying impacts and impacters
The  ‘impacter pays’ principle requires costs to be identified, measured and
apportioned across impacters. Costs incurred in meeting legal requirements, for
example, would be the responsibility of individuals under the ‘impacter pays’
principle. Measuring the costs of degradation may not be straightforward, making it
difficult to design or set the correct cost share under an ‘impacter pays’ approach.
However, while it may not be possible to identify the share accurately, requiring
impacters to meet at least some of the costs of addressing degradation may give
them important signals about the true costs of resource use.
While the ‘impacter pays’ principle can be used to internalise the costs of
biodiversity loss, governments may choose not to apply it in all cases because:
•   it may not be technically possible or cost effective to identify and charge
impacters, for example, where biodiversity loss result from past practices or
where the cause of biodiversity loss is ‘non-point source’ degradation; and/or
•   adoption of the ‘impacter pays’ principle is considered to impose excessive
burdens on resource users.
Degradation resulting from past activities
At times, the loss of biodiversity may be attributed to decisions made by resource
users long ago, or to decisions that were encouraged by previous government
policies. In these cases, it may not be possible to apply the ‘impacter pays’ principle
because the impacters responsible may no longer exist or may not be found
(AACM 1995). From an economic perspective, there is little rationale to charge
retrospectively for biodiversity loss because it is not possible to change past
behaviour and correct past inefficiencies. As a result, the efficiency gains from
applying the ‘impacter pays’ principle may not apply for the case of degradation
caused by past activities. Further, it may be considered inequitable to penaliseSOME PRACTICAL
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impacters retrospectively for complying with the accepted legal frameworks and
policies of the past (Tilton 1995).
For these reasons, Tilton  (1995, p.  139) argues that financing the repair of past
degradation should be based on the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, which is likely to
imply some funding from taxpayers:
Efficiency and equity are better served if government pays for cleaning up past
pollution.
Non-point source or diffuse degradation
For some causes of environmental degradation — such as non-point source — it
may not be possible to determine what activities by whom and in what proportion
are responsible for biodiversity loss. This difficulty is complicated further by the
fact that environmental impacts from resource use depend not only on a particular
activity, but also on how, where and possibly when it is conducted (Tobey and
Smets 1996). It may not always be possible therefore to determine the appropriate
charge to impose on impacters. In other cases, while it may be possible to identify
impacters and the value of the charges, it may not be possible or cost effective to
charge individuals or hold them responsible for their impacts.
According to Marshall  (1998), the difficulty of applying the ‘impacter pays’
principle to non-point source degradation has often been used as a justification for
not applying it at all. Similarly, Tobey and Smets  (1996) consider that the
difficulties partly explain the limited amount of cost internalisation in agriculture.
However, while apportioning responsibility and the costs of biodiversity
conservation across specific individuals may be difficult, the ‘impacter pays’
principle could be applied on an approximate basis by making groups of individuals
collectively responsible for conservation outcomes in a sub-region. This would
encourage individual members of the group to monitor others’ behaviour
(Bromley 1996). While this less precise approach is not ideal, application of the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle as an alternative an also result in similar imprecision
(see below) if specific beneficiaries, and the magnitude of their benefits, are not
identified and the general community bears a portion of their costs.
Marshall (1998) notes that apportioning costs to groups under the ‘impacter pays’
principle appears to meet greater resistance than apportioning costs to the general
community under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, even though both approaches
may be imprecise. It is not clear why inaccurate allocation of costs to the
community is any more acceptable than inaccurately allocating costs among
impacters. Such tensions highlight the need to develop better tools for measuring30 COST SHARING FOR
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and charging for non-point impacts to enable more accurate adoption of the
‘impacter pays’ principle.
Equity considerations
Adoption of the ‘impacter pays’ principle may have social consequences as it may
add significantly to the costs faced by resource users (although some costs may be
passed on to consumers through higher prices). This may be important especially if
the commercial viability of resource users is uncertain. For example, Martin,
Lubulwa, Riley and Helali  (2000) observe that the majority of average farm
businesses in Australia currently earn a rate of return of less than 3  per cent.
Biodiversity conservation could therefore be a commercially unattainable
investment for many individuals.
Some commentators consider that the financial viability, or otherwise, of resource
users should not be used as a reason to excuse them from the ‘impacter pays’
principle. For instance, the Sustainable Land and Water Resource Committee (1999,
p. 3) considers that:
… poor enterprise viability or management is not a justification for governments to
substitute public funds for landholder funding of remedial works.
Similarly, Marshall  (1998) considers that such problems should be addressed
through access to temporary credit rather than through release from responsibility
for the costs that resource users’ activities may impose on others.
Nevertheless, financial hardship and political acceptability could be expected to
affect compliance levels among resource users. The more difficult the
circumstances for individuals reliant on practices that degrade biodiversity, the
greater the level of monitoring and enforcement that is likely to be required to
ensure conservation under an ‘impacter pays’ approach. Since monitoring and
enforcement can result in considerable implementation costs, this can reduce the
benefits of applying the ‘impacter pays’ principle and may compromise the
achievement of conservation outcomes.
For these reasons, governments may choose not to adopt the ‘impacter pays’
principle. Alternatively, governments may choose to apply the ‘impacter pays’
principle but offer assistance to resources users in the short term to help them adjust
to its adoption (box 4.1).
Issues surrounding the social consequences of cost sharing arrangements, and the
possible need for adjustment assistance, are complex and require furtherSOME PRACTICAL
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examination on a case by case basis. This should involve consideration of the
implications of any precedents that may be established.
Box 4.1 Adjusting cost shares to provide assistance
For social reasons, governments may consider phasing in additional responsibilities for
individuals to ensure biodiversity conservation. One way to do this might be to adjust
cost shares in favour of individuals. This could involve, for example, adopting the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle in the short term to ease the transition to eventual adoption
of the ‘impacter pays’ principle or it could involve governments meeting costs that
would otherwise be the responsibility of individual beneficiary groups under the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle.
Binning and Young, for example, consider that short term adoption of the ‘beneficiary
pays’ principle may be justified to gain acceptance of more stringent environmental
responsibilities and on equity grounds since more stringent requirements effectively re-
define existing property rights. However, they argue that adjustment assistance should
only occur when it is associated with a permanent change in property rights attached to
land title, so that a permanent change in land use practices is guaranteed.
An alternative approach to help resource users adjust is to introduce cost sharing
arrangements gradually or with advance warning. For example, the Victorian State
Groundwater Council introduced the restructure of the water sector gradually by
freezing groundwater charges for two years, while it developed a framework for
ongoing management of groundwater resources and examined cost sharing
arrangements between groundwater users and the government. However, this
approach may pose risks to the environment if it encourages or enables resource users
to remove or destroy biodiversity assets on their land to avoid incurring costs for
retaining or managing them in future (chapter 3).
Sources: Binning and Young (1997); Victorian State Groundwater Council (1997).
4.3 Applying the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle
The ‘beneficiary pays’ principle allocates costs on the basis of who benefits from
conservation. It requires policy makers to identify beneficiaries and to assess and
apportion benefits across them.
Identifying benefits and beneficiaries
As outlined below, adoption of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may not represent a
trouble-free alternative to adoption of the ‘impacter pays’ principle. However, it
appears to be more widely used as a basis for environmental policy in agriculture,
partly because it has more support from resource owners (Tobey and Smets 1996).32 COST SHARING FOR
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A distinction needs to be made between the private and public benefits of
conservation activities to apply the ‘user pays’ and ‘beneficiary compensates’
components of this principle. Private benefits of conservation accrue to resource
users (such as landholders) and other individuals. Examples include the commercial
value in hay and seed production from planting perennial plant species such as
lucerne, and benefits such as stock shelter, prevention of erosion, provision of
drought feeding opportunities and aesthetic improvements from native vegetation
management (Coorong and Districts Local Action Plan Steering Committee 2000;
Crosthwaite 1998). Public benefits accrue to the broader community.
AACM (1995) argues that it can be easier to identify beneficiaries and thus apply
the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle than to identify impacters and apply the ‘impacter
pays’ principle. However, identifying specific beneficiaries (other than the
individual directly undertaking a conservation action) under the ‘user pays’
component may be no less difficult, especially where the precise value of
biodiversity enhancement is difficult to assess or where intangible benefits are
involved. Despite the difficulties, it is important to identify the specific beneficiaries
of conservation as far as possible (given the costs of doing so) to avoid excessive
calls on government budgets. For instance, ‘non-consumptive’ beneficiaries, such as
tourists, should not avoid the ‘user pays net’ (Madden  1996) as excluding such
users can reinforce perceptions that some uses of natural resources are, and should
be, free.
The share of costs attributable to a government under the ‘beneficiary compensates’
component will depend on the level of public benefits generated. Governments
should contribute funding only where activities generate net public benefits.
Further, the ‘beneficiary compensates’ principle should generally be used to allocate
only the costs of conservation that resource users are not already legally required to
undertake under existing property rights (see, for example, Hajkowicz and
Young  2000). This is because it is not the purpose of government to meet
individuals production costs, including the costs of complying with legal
requirements.
When government funding is provided, it does not necessarily need to reflect fully
the public benefits generated by an activity, and it need be up to only a level that
triggers the necessary investment from the private sector (SLWRMC  1999,
chapter 3). Thus, payments from governments should reflect only the net cost to
resource users of undertaking additional conservation, as limited by the following
criteria:
•   Payments to individuals should be net of any benefits — financial or otherwise
— that they or other specific beneficiaries derive from the activity. That is, the
‘user pays’ component should also be applied.SOME PRACTICAL
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•   Payments to individuals to cover the costs of inputs should be net of other
payments or subsidies from governments that reduce the cost of inputs to avoid
‘double payment’.
•   Payments should only return resource users to their pre-conservation level of
wealth; individuals should not be better off as a result of payments provided by
governments for biodiversity conservation.
Since adoption of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may require beneficiaries to pay
for conservation services that they have not paid for previously, application of this
principle can have social implications. To help individuals adjust to new
arrangements, governments may consider providing assistance or introducing new
arrangements gradually (box 4.1).
Funding the costs of conservation under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle is likely to
be an expensive exercise for governments, particularly compared with approaches
reflecting the ‘impacter pays’ principle.
Valuing benefits and attributing cost shares
Cost sharing arrangements under the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle can be determined
using various approaches to estimate benefits and thus attribute costs:
•   careful identification of beneficiaries and the proportion of benefits they receive
— this focuses on quantifying in detail the expected benefits accruing to
beneficiaries from an activity and is the approach suggested by the Murray-
Darling Basin Commission (MDBC 1996);
•   a  ‘rule of thumb’ to approximate who benefits and thus who should be
responsible for meeting the costs; or
•   auctioning of payments for the provision of biodiversity conservation services.
As a general rule, the more detailed the method for valuing and attributing benefits,
the more expensive and time consuming that method will be. The most appropriate
method will reflect a trade-off between the cost of using the method and the scale of
the net benefits expected to accrue.
Detailed impact assessments
Detailed impact analysis (on the basis of present values) can indicate where the
benefits and costs of an activity accrue, their magnitude and whether the activity
results in net benefits overall and thus whether it should proceed.34 COST SHARING FOR
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The intangible benefits of conservation can be difficult to estimate, but some
methods do exist. At the simplest level, decision makers may estimate a minimum
value of intangible benefits that an activity needs to generate to justify the costs of
undertaking it (a ‘threshold’ analysis). (Information on methods to estimate
intangible environmental benefits can be found in Bennett  1998; Freeman  1999;
Hanley, Shogren and White 1997.)
The most detailed approaches for identifying and evaluating the impacts of a
conservation activity are likely to involve cost benefit analysis using discount rates
to account for benefits and costs that occur at different points in time. Such
approaches may even go as far as identifying impacts at fine spatial levels. Thus,
they can provide clear guidance in determining cost sharing arrangements and how
payments should move between resource users, other individuals and governments.
However, these approaches, particularly when conducted at a very fine spatial scale,
can be time consuming and expensive and may be feasible only for large projects at
a regional or catchment level. Further, they may not be necessary where expected
benefits are mainly public (Crosthwaite 1998). Boxes 4.2 – 4.4 outline three cases
involving detailed approaches for establishing cost sharing arrangements.
Box 4.2 Determining cost sharing arrangements — Goulbourn Broken
Catchment
The Goulburn Broken Catchment in Victoria covers around 2.4 million hectares. The
Catchment Management Authority recently completed a Native Vegetation Plan, which
outlines activities needed to address biodiversity loss and increase native vegetation
levels. Such activities include for example, fencing and de-stocking to protect remnant
native vegetation and the establishment of vegetation corridors to connect habitats.
A cost sharing arrangement to fund the activities will be determined using information
generated from a series of environmental and economic models. A study has been
undertaken to compile an inventory of the key goods and services produced in the
catchment and to identify how these are supported by natural processes (ecosystem
services). A study will be conducted to assess the impacts on outputs of varying the
levels of ecosystem services provided across the region. The benefits of these different
levels of ecosystem services — both public and private — will be estimated across the
region using data such as changes in the market value of production and the costs of
substituting ecosystem services with technologically available replacements (for
example, the cost of replacing natural predators with pesticides).
It is intended that cost shares for environmental activities identified through this study
will be determined by the resulting spread of benefits and costs.
Sources: Crosthwaite (1998); CSIRO (1999); Goulburn Broken Catchment Management Authority (1999);
Goulburn Broken Catchment Management Authority (2000).SOME PRACTICAL
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Box 4.3 Cost sharing — the Coorong District Local Action Plan
The Coorong is located in South Australia. The Coorong and Districts Local Action
Plan (LAP) addresses various environmental issues facing the region, including
dryland salinity, erosion, water quality decline and feral species invasion. Projects
under the LAP are eligible for government funding if they improve the environment.
The LAP specifies a number of priority activities and project proposals that address a
priority activity are eligible for higher levels of government funding. Priority activities
include:
•   fencing off areas of native vegetation, where the funding level depends on the size
of the area to be fenced and the ‘boundary-to-area’ ratio;
•   protecting threatened or endangered species or communities; and
•   protecting areas undisturbed by human activity.
Extra incentive payments are also available to landholders who adhere to specific
guidelines in undertaking conservation activities. Bonus payments for revegetation, for
example, are available if landholders meet any of the following criteria:
•   planting only local indigenous species;
•   planting species of the same habitat type as that of the original native vegetation;
•   planting five understorey species for every tree species;
•   having a minimum planted area of 5 hectares;
•   having corridors at least 50 metres wide that link at both ends to existing natural
vegetation of at least 10 hectares each; and
•   planting priority vegetation types.
Bonus payments increase as a project proposal meets more criteria.
Detailed cost sharing arrangements under the LAP are based on the ‘beneficiary pays’
principle. The framework recommends cost shares for landholders, the local
community and the wider community, based on each sector’s share of present value
market and nonmarket benefits accruing from particular activities.
Cost shares are established for activities such as native revegetation, farm forestry,
saline land reclamation and remnant vegetation, and wetlands and habitat
conservation. The cost shares for each of these activities differ according to the private
and public benefits they generate; for example, landholders may pay up to 93 per cent
of the cost of activities aimed at saline land reclamation, while the local community
pays 3 per cent and the wider community pays the balance. The higher cost share of
landholders implies that these activities generate significant private benefits.
Conversely, landholders pay only 6 per cent of the costs of activities aimed at remnant
vegetation, wetlands and habitat conservation, while the local community pays 17 per
cent and the wider community pays 77 per cent. This arrangement implies that these
activities generate mainly public benefits that accrue to the general community.
Sources: Coorong and Districts Local Action Plan Steering Committee (1997); Dames and Moore (2000).36 COST SHARING FOR
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Box 4.4 Determining cost sharing arrangements — Liverpool Plains
Liverpool Plains is a region in northern New South Wales experiencing various natural
resource problems, including dryland salinity, flooding and soil erosion. To address
these issues, a modelling approach to evaluate on-ground activities was undertaken to
provide input to the Liverpool Plains Catchment Investment Strategy. The strategy
outlines key activities that need to be undertaken in the catchment to address natural
resource problems and approaches for sharing the costs of those activities.
The recommendations of the strategy are based on a series of biophysical and
economic models developed for the region. These models divided the catchment into
several biophysical regions or ‘land management units’ (LMUs) for which key physical
problems (such as soil erosion) were assessed and mapped. Potential activities to
mitigate these problems were identified (‘recommended technical actions’) along with
the benefits to each LMU of undertaking them. The total estimated commercial benefits
of undertaking the recommended technical actions for the whole catchment were
around $100 million over 25 years, while the nonmarket benefits were estimated to be
at least $70 million.
The incidence of these benefits (along with the costs of the recommended technical
actions) across the LMUs within the region was also identified. The models indicated
an uneven distribution of costs and benefits across the region; for example, eight of the
fourteen LMUs were expected to experience a net loss from undertaking the
recommended technical actions because many of the benefits of their activities would
accrue downstream. The ratio of expected benefits to costs from undertaking activities
in each LMU varied from over 9:1 for ‘recipient’ LMUs to 1:14 for ‘donor’ LMUs.
The Liverpool Plains Land Management Committee considered that the uneven
distribution of benefits and costs across the catchment emphasised the need to
develop intra-catchment cost sharing arrangements. In other words, the direct
beneficiaries of some activities within the catchment should share the costs of activities
undertaken in other LMUs. This is consistent with the ‘user pays’ component of the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle.
Source: Liverpool Plains Land Management Committee (2000).
Rules of thumb
Rules of thumb, based on an approximation of the expected benefits and costs of a
conservation activity, may be used to determine cost sharing arrangements. They
may not be as accurate as approaches involving detailed evaluation, but may be
useful where frequent cost sharing decisions are made for activities that are
relatively low cost. In these cases, it may be cost effective to resort to less detailed
but cheaper means to determine cost sharing arrangements.SOME PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
37
An example of a rule of thumb is provided by the maximum 1:1 cost share ratio
adopted by some programs of the Natural Heritage Trust. Under this approach, the
Commonwealth Government provides funds for projects that contribute at least one
dollar of proponent (which may include other levels of government) funding for
every dollar of Commonwealth funding (box 4.5). The rationale for adoption of this
rule is unclear.
Box 4.5 Cost sharing — some programs of the Natural Heritage Trust
The Natural Heritage Trust supports a variety of conservation programs, including
Bushcare and Landcare. It offers funding assistance for community-based projects
(projects run by one individual are considered only in exceptional cases) that benefit
the environment and that offer high returns on government funds. Project proposals
are assessed at both the regional and State levels, and any project deemed suitable
for funding must also be approved at the Commonwealth level.
A regional assessment panel, comprising members of the catchment management
authority, the community and a technical assessment panel, ranks projects according
to their value for money (assessed against similar projects) and whether they are
considered to have a high likelihood of achieving their stated objectives.
Most Natural Heritage Trust programs assign cost shares according to the maximum
1:1 rule. (Exceptions include land acquisition for the National Reserve Program, which
allows up to two dollars of Commonwealth funding for each proponent dollar.) Only in
rare cases does Commonwealth funding exceed 1:1 — usually only where very high
biodiversity values are at stake and proponents are unable to meet half the cost of the
project.
The Natural Heritage Trust also employs other rules of thumb in setting cost shares.
Under Landcare and Bushcare, for example, government funding rates for fencing are
fixed on a per metre basis. These rates are determined according to the average cost
of fencing across Australia, but the rate may be increased if the terrain is particularly
difficult (implying that the project is more costly), or if the landholder agrees to
covenant the property (implying that environmental benefits are likely to be greater
because they are secured for the long term).
Sources: ANAO  (1998); NHT  (1999); Department of Natural Resources and Environment (Vic.) (pers.
comm., Bendigo, 25 October 2000).
Rules of thumb may be appropriate for small projects to reduce administration costs
or to reduce the potential for strategic behaviour on the part of resource users, which
may occur in individual negotiations for management agreements (Hanley et
al.  1998). However, a drawback of this approach is that providing the same
government cost share for various activities may not adequately account for the
variation in costs and public and private benefits generated by a given activity
across landholdings or regions. A set subsidy for tree retention may not take into
account the varying benefits of tree retention, for example, in one region as opposed38 COST SHARING FOR
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to another, or the variation in benefits of retaining one species of tree over another.
This may result in a higher (or lower) cost share from the government than would
be appropriate through a more careful and individual determination of cost shares
which has implications for efficiency. The tradeoff between less accuracy and the
savings in implementation costs of this approach must be considered in the
determination of cost sharing arrangements.
Auctions
Auctions can be used to determine and allocate cost shares under the ‘beneficiary
pays’ principle, by-passing the need to calculate and attribute benefit shares to
individuals specifically. Auctions allow market forces to dictate cost shares and to
select individual projects for funding. Landholders bid for the amount of
government funding or compensation required to undertake biodiversity
conservation on their land.
The concept of auctioning payments for biodiversity conservation is relatively new
in Australia. The Victorian Government is developing a potential auction system for
the conservation of native vegetation in the first instance (Forster 2000) and the
Liverpool Plains Land Management Committee (New South Wales) intends to trial
auctions in connection with the World Wide Fund for Nature (Moss  2000). In
contrast, the US Department of Agriculture has used auctions for conservation for
some time. Its auction process incorporates an ‘environmental benefits index’
priority system (see below) to compensate landholders for diverting land from
agricultural production to the provision of conservation services (box 4.6).
Auctions for determining cost sharing arrangements provide a means of dealing
with incomplete information. Governments generally have incomplete information
about the costs to landholders of undertaking conservation and about the private
benefits that accrue from it (Stoneham et al. 2000). Fixed payments to landholders
for undertaking particular activities can over-compensate those landholders with
relatively high private net benefits, as well as those with low marginal damage
abatement costs. (When fixed payments are used to encourage voluntary
conservation, undercompensation is unlikely to occur because landholders will not
volunteer to undertake conservation if the payment is insufficient.)
Auctions can help overcome these information problems and the potential for over-
compensation by enabling governments to determine the minimum amount
necessary to trigger additional voluntary conservation. Auctions reveal to
governments the cost of conservation activities because each bid indicates the
minimum amount of funding that a landholder requires (the landholder’s
opportunity cost net of any private benefits) (Stoneham et al.  2000). ThroughSOME PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
39
competitive bidding, the participation of many bidders in a well designed auction
allows the government to obtain conservation at least cost, promoting value for
money (Moss 2000; Reichelderfer and Boggess 1988).
Box 4.6 Auctions for biodiversity conservation — the Conservation
Reserve Program
The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) runs the Conservation Reserve Program, a
voluntary program which offers compensation to landholders to divert land from
production to reserves to promote biodiversity conservation. While originally
established in 1985 to reduce soil erosion, the program has since expanded to include
the objectives of improving water quality, providing wildlife habitat and addressing other
environmental concerns. Each Conservation Reserve Program contract runs for ten
years, after which time it expires. Landholders may renew contracts only by reapplying
for funding through the auction process.
The costs to landholders of providing environmental services include the:
•   opportunity cost of removing the land from agricultural production, including the net
present value of earnings forgone;
•   costs involved in establishing/converting and maintaining the land in a Conservation
Reserve Program acceptable state; and
•   possible associated decreases in land value.
The Conservation Reserve Program uses an auction system to obtain bids from
landholders for the minimum annual rental payment the landholder will accept from the
government to divert land from agricultural production to the establishment and
maintenance of a protective cover of vegetation or to other approved conservation
practices. Landholders may choose to place a bid that reflects the full cost of the
service provision, or some portion of the total cost. Bids may be discounted by the
landholders’ expected private benefits such as personal satisfaction from participating
in environmentally beneficial activities.
The cornerstone of the auction system is the environmental benefits index (EBI) which
ecologists constructed to express the relative scarcity of different environmental goods
and services. By establishing priority activities and areas for conservation, this index
signals to landholders the relative value of various environmental services. It also
assists the government in ranking the applications for funding, based on the cost
effectiveness and priority value of the bids.
Apart from scoring relatively highly on the index, landholders may improve their
chances of obtaining funding by electing to bear a higher cost share. Information is
provided by the government to help landholders identify fair land rental values for
various locations, which enables landholders to more easily identify a competitive cost
share bid.
In 1999, 36 million acres of land were under contract to provide environmental services
under the Conservation Reserve Program. Community acceptance in the United States
is so high that Congress aims to expand the total area available by another 12 million
acres in the next signup in 2002.
Sources: Amosson et al. (2000); Stoneham et al. (2000); Wiebe, Tegene and Kuhn (1996).40 COST SHARING FOR
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Another advantage of auctions for determining cost shares is that they may be
designed to enable public funding to be directed at high priority conservation issues.
Variations in environmental benefits produced by a given activity across individuals
or regions are accommodated by an environmental benefits index which provides a
common base for comparing different habitats and environmental outcomes.
Different habitats may be allocated points in the index according to their scarcity
and ecological importance, for example, (Stoneham et al. 2000). Thus, the index can
reflect particular priorities, and government funds can be directed to those activities
that perform well against the index.
A key limitation of the auction approach is that it may be relevant only for
encouraging voluntary conservation and it is not relevant if all landholders need to
be involved in undertaking the conservation activity. Further, the benefits of
achieving voluntary conservation at minimum cost may not be realised if there are
only a few bidders, because the possibility of collusion arises. Moreover, it is likely
to take considerable time to develop an assessment system to evaluate conservation
proposals or bids on a consistent basis. However, alternative approaches may also
encounter similar hurdles; for example, it can be administratively costly to conduct
one-to-one negotiations to establish conservation agreements, given the time
required (Stoneham et al. 2000).
4.4 Ensuring compliance
To ensure that individuals or groups who receive funding from beneficiaries for
biodiversity conservation meet their obligations, arrangements allowing for periodic
monitoring, enforcement and review of outcomes need to be established. When
government funding is provided, the establishment of these mechanisms should
improve both the effectiveness and accountability of government involvement.
Monitoring and review systems
Government payments through cost sharing for biodiversity conservation should be
conditional on the achievement of conservation outcomes. It is difficult to ensure
this because biodiversity outcomes may take a long time to become apparent.
However, it is possible to monitor short term and medium term indicators of
progress that are linked to the achievement of longer term outcomes. Another
condition that may be attached to the provision of government funding for
conservation, is to provide funds only for activities that are specified as part of a
regional or catchment management plan, so funds are more likely to be directed at
priority conservation issues. Alternatively, or in addition, payments could beSOME PRACTICAL
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provided only on satisfactory completion of the conservation activity
(MDBC 1996).
A minimum requirement for ensuring compliance in cost sharing arrangements is
the establishment of monitoring and review arrangements. These should encompass
regular ongoing monitoring of specific conservation activities as well as reviews of
the cost sharing arrangements.
Management agreements
A management agreement is a voluntary contract between a landholder and another
party, such as the government or a conservation group, regarding the use and
management of land. Binding management agreements restrict the types of land
uses that may be undertaken or they remove or amend entitlements (Binning and
Young 1997). As such, they re-define property rights over land because individuals
agree to surrender some of the entitlements they would have had under the original
property rights structure, or agree to meet new obligations that would not otherwise
necessarily apply (Wiebe, Tegene and Kuhn  1996). However, nonbinding
agreements also exist which focus on formally recognising individuals’
conservation efforts without necessarily prohibiting certain current or future land
uses or entitlements (Binning and Young 1997).
Management agreements may be permanent in nature (termed ‘covenants’) or
temporary. Both types may have roles to play in encouraging commitment to
conservation and in ensuring the delivery of conservation outcomes by linking
payment to the individual’s involvement in an enforceable and lasting arrangement.
Temporary agreements may secure the involvement of those who are interested in
conservation but who are not prepared to enter into a permanent agreement.
Covenants are attached to the title of land and can allow management agreements to
survive changes in property ownership. This ensures that the conservation outcomes
achieved by one owner are not ‘undone’ by future owners of the site.
As individuals volunteer to participate in these arrangements, they may deliver
higher levels of compliance than can be delivered by some other conservation
arrangements involving cost sharing. Crosthwaite  (1998), for example, considers
that management agreements may offer the best prospects for securing the future of
Australia’s native grasslands. On the other hand, management agreements can be
costly to establish and enforce because they are site specific. Further, on re-
negotiation of fixed term agreements, landholders may have an opportunity to ‘hold
a valued environmental asset to ransom’, potentially adding to costs (although these
problems may be overcome by requiring the return of funds previously paid if the
agreement cannot be re-negotiated) (Binning and Young 1997). As a result of the42 COST SHARING FOR
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costs, Binning and Young (1997) recommend that management agreements be used
to target unique areas, where it is a priority to secure a particular ongoing
management approach or to secure a permanent change in management practices in
exchange for a once-off incentive payment. However, they argue that ongoing
management agreements are not suitable for meeting broad conservation objectives.
Due to the costs of establishing and enforcing management agreements, Colman et
al.  (1992) consider that conservation goals may be achieved at lower cost by
outright land purchase by the government — in a sense, the acquisition of all
property rights by the government. To this extent, the activities of agencies such as
the Trust for Nature (Victoria) in land purchase and the establishment of covenants
are significant. The Trust purchases land, establishes a covenant upon it and then
sells it to private buyers sympathetic to its conservation goals (Trust for
Nature  2000a;  2000b). The work of the Trust illustrates that funding for
conservation on private land need not necessarily be reliant on government budgets.
Funds may be forthcoming from other individuals, philanthropic groups or industry.
In Australia, management agreements commonly exist between landholders and
either government agencies or non-profit environmental organisations, with the
latter paying landholders for undertaking (or not undertaking) certain activities.
Under the Bushcare program of the Natural Heritage Trust, cost shares on the part
of the Commonwealth government may vary according to the level of the
proponent’s commitment to conservation. Government funding is often higher if
landholders enter into a management agreement, and higher still for the greater
degree of certainty and long term conservation delivered by a covenant (Bushcare,
pers. comm., Canberra, 7 November 2000).
Management agreements may be considered contracts for the purchase of
environmental services from landholders or rental payments for restricting the use
of land (Hodge 1997). Management agreements to achieve environmental outcomes
are also in place in the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand.
Accreditation schemes
Market approaches involving environmental labelling or accreditation can also
promote compliance with conservation goals. Environmental labelling or
accreditation schemes may occur where suppliers are able to differentiate their
products to consumers on the grounds of environmental ‘superiority’ (for example,
if they are produced using environmentally benign practices).
By allowing only those suppliers who invest in biodiversity conservation to carry an
environmental label or to access a niche market, these mechanisms allow customersSOME PRACTICAL
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to discriminate and express a preference between suppliers who do and do not
invest in biodiversity conservation. These mechanisms can be effective for
encouraging conservation provided it is possible to segregate the market for
environmentally friendly products and provided the product can capture the benefits
of doing so through higher prices and/or increased sales. If this occurs, these
mechanisms can allow biodiversity values, such as existence values, to be expressed
in the market place.
An environmental management system is a method for certifying that suppliers’
products are environmentally sound. The product will be certified or labelled only if
it is demonstrated that it is produced in a way that is consistent with
environmentally sensitive practices.
Environmental management systems ensure that the proceeds from the sale of these
goods are directed back to the environment partly because only those producers that
invest in biodiversity conservation can sell the certified product. Thus, product
accreditation can generate private sector funding needed to invest in biodiversity
conservation. It also provides incentives for other suppliers to invest in conservation
to join the scheme in the expectation of receiving higher returns.
By creating a market incentive to conserve biodiversity, these market based
schemes may reduce calls on government budgets to fund conservation activities
through cost sharing arrangements. As a result, government encouragement of these
industry initiated schemes in the initial stages to help identify their potential may be
worthwhile if the long term success of such schemes reduces the call on government
support for conservation. The New Zealand Ministerial Advisory Committee (2000)
recommends that governments should facilitate and encourage early adoption of
biodiversity related criteria in accreditation schemes in the future.
An industry initiated accreditation scheme reflecting environmental criteria already
in place is that between onion growers in Tasmania and Britain’s largest
supermarket chain, Tescos. Tescos’ supplier, Field Fresh, offers a premium price to
Tasmanian onion growers who meet the Nature’s Choice Quality Assurance system,
which includes a wildlife and landscape conservation component (ANZECC 2000).
In Australia, the Liverpool Plains Land Management Committee (New South
Wales) is considering linking its cost sharing arrangements to product accreditation
under an environmental management system (box 4.7).44 COST SHARING FOR
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Box 4.7 Linking cost sharing and accreditation — Liverpool Plains
A salinity management strategy has recently been finalised for the Liverpool Plains
catchment in New South Wales. Under the strategy, landholders are encouraged to
participate in sustainable land management practices to reduce salinity and associated
problems.
The sustainable land management options identified in the strategy vary in stringency.
To increase incentives to adopt the more stringent practices, it is proposed that greater
financial assistance will be provided to landholders adopting stricter practices and
lower financial assistance will be provided to those adopting less strict practices.
The most stringent form of sustainable land management practices recommended
under the salinity management strategy involves adoption of the ISO 14000 series of
environmental management standards, which are designed to provide an
internationally recognised framework for environmental management and evaluation.
To encourage adoption of these practices, it is proposed that a product accreditation
scheme be developed for suppliers adopting the ISO 14000 standards. Products from
these suppliers could be marketed as being environmentally sustainable in the hope
that these suppliers could secure a niche market and/or higher product prices. If this is
achieved, then the commercial benefits of producing product under the ISO  14000
standard may be sufficient to encourage other landholders to adopt environmentally
sustainable practices.
Sources: Liverpool Plains Land Management Committee  (2000); Liverpool Plains Land Management
Committee (pers. comm., Tamworth, 8 November 2000).
4.5 Summary
•   Clarifying property rights is a fundamental step for determining which cost
sharing principle to apply.
•   In principle, the ‘impacter pays’ principle should be adopted to internalise
external costs and promote efficient outcomes.
•   There may be cases where governments choose not to adopt the ‘impacter pays’
principle because it is not technically feasible or cost effective to do so or
because it is considered to generate an excessive burden on resource user. In
these cases, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle may be preferred.
•   Where the community asks resource users to meet a higher level of
environmental amenity than required under existing property rights, the
‘beneficiary pays’ principle is relevant to encourage voluntary conservation in
the short term.
•   If community demands for a higher level of environmental amenity persist in the
long term, governments may choose to either share costs under the ‘beneficiarySOME PRACTICAL
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pays’ principle in the long term or may consider changing property rights to
reflect new community expectations. The choice between these options will
depend on the net benefits of each.
•   Cost sharing arrangements can have social implications. Governments may
therefore choose not to adopt a particular cost sharing principle on this basis or
may choose to adjust cost shares in favour of individuals in the short term to
help them adjust.
•   When governments provide funding for conservation under the ‘beneficiary
pays’ principle, they should only fund costs that are incurred in generating net
public benefits. In principle, government funding need not reflect public benefits
in full and need only be the minimum necessary to trigger additional
conservation by the private sector.
•   Auctions may be one way to determine the minimum amount required from
governments to encourage additional conservation by the private sector and may
also allow government funds to be directed to low cost providers of
conservation.REFERENCES 47
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